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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

and incidence of federal taxes, 2such variations are not ipso facto
in conflict with the Constitution.'
J.L.

COUNTY ATTORNEY'S FEEs-ExEMPT rRtom FEDERAL INCOME

TAx.-Appellee was employed by the Board of Commissioners of
Duval County, Florida, to represent it as legal advisor. His salary,

covering compensation for attendance at meetings, preparation of
resolutions and contracts, legal advice and services in litigated matters of an ordinary nature, was fixed by resolutions of the Board,
and was paid to him monthly. In connection with certain litigated
cases, extraordinary in nature, and for services rendered in regard
to issuance of bonds extra compensation was paid him. It is conceded that he maintained his private law office during this period,
but that he devoted approximately seventy-five per cent of his time
as attorney for the Board, and did not allow his private practice
to interfere with his duties to the county. Held, that appellee was
an employee of a political subdivision of a state and as such his
compensation was exempt from taxation pursuant to the Revenue
Act of 1926.1

United States of America v. J. Turner Butler, 49 F.

(2d) 52 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
An attorney who has not contracted to give his entire and exclusive services to a state instrumentality but was free to engage,
and was engaged in private practice, did not thereby become an
officer or employee within the purview of the statute.2 The court
here, however, takes the position that the statute 3 authorizing the
deduction of compensation received as an employee of a state, or a
political subdivision thereof, does not require that such employee
shall give his full time to the subject of his employment, and whether
he gives his full time or not has no legal significance as a test. But,
if it has any, appellee has satisfied the requirement, for he was first
obligated to give all the time necessary to accomplish the tasks re' Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 112, 40 Sup.
Ct. 309 (1920) ; Bistline v. United States, 229 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. Idaho, 1916);
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cash, 67 Mont. 585, 216 Pac. 782 (1923).
' Section 1211 provides: "Any taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1924
or prior revenue acts upon any individual in respect of amounts received by him
as compensation for personal services as an officer or employee of any state
or political subdivision thereof (except to the extent that such compensation is
paid by the United States Government directly or indirectly), shall, subject to
the statutory period of limitations properly applicable thereto, be abated, credited, or refunded."
'Blair v. Byers, 35 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
8
Supra note 2.

TAX COMMENT
quired of him by the Board and could take no other business, except in his spare time.
Hutcheson, C.J., in a concurring opinion takes the stand that
as to those services for which appellee was allowed extra compensation he was not an employee, but that the remuneration thus received
was paid to him as an agency of the Board; nevertheless, the income
thus derived was exempt, for to tax it would be to affect a governmental agency in such a4 manner as directly to interfere with the
functions of government.
The idea of control or right of control characterizes the relation of employer and employee and differentiates the employee from
the independent contractor.0 Except that appellee was required to
use his judgment and skill as an attorney, his services Were under
the direct control of the Board.
The attempt of the government to tax the appellee's income
was based on an extremely narrow interpretation of the statute,
and was properly frustrated.
P.A.

INCOME OF CORPORATION-TAXABLE IN STATE OF ORIGINARBITRARILY ALLOCATING FoRMuLA.-Appellant, a New York cor-

poration, established a plant in Asheville, North Carolina, and there
manufactured its entire output of heavy leathers. A warehouse and
salesrooms were maintained in New York State. Sales were made
throughout the United States and Canada; the evidence tended to
show that forty per cent of the output of the Asheville plant was
sent to New York and the balance was shipped direct on orders received from there. Evidence was offered to show that seventeen
per cent of the total income of the corporation was attributable to
its manufacturing and tanning operations in North Carolina. The
assessment as allocated by the Commissioner of Revenue of that state
allotted to the state for the purposes of taxation, pursuant to the
prescribed statutory method, approximately eighty-five per cent of
the appellant's annual income. Appellant aggrieved by adverse decisions in the state courts which upheld the validity of the state
statutes appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the ground
that the statute in question was arbitrary and its operation repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, Held, that the statutory method as
applied to the appellant's business for the years in question operated
unreasonably and arbitrarily in attributing to North Carolina a percentage of income out of all appropriate proportion to the business
'Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct 172 (1926);
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928).
'Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252 (1909);
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup.

Ct. 403 (1916).

